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Strategic disclosure of firm-specific skills
in wage bargaining
Ays¸e Mumcu1
We study the bargaining relationship between a firm and its incumbent worker
who possesses firm-specific human capital. We show that the worker’s ability to
disclose his skills strategically increases his bargaining power. The game may have
ineﬃcient equilibria where delays occur in real time. With the addition of outside
options for both the firm and the worker, delays are shortened whenever outside
options are credible threats. Our model also predicts that wages are procyclical,
and there can be a variation in wages for a given job level.
1 Introduction
Employment contracts are inherently incomplete. In a typical employment
contract the worker agrees to carry out the instructions of the employer,
within broad limits, in return of a prespecified wage. In the absence of
comprehensive contracts, productive eﬃciency requires that successive adap-
tations to the changing job and market conditions take place. In the im-
plementation of these adaptations, parties may find it profitable to bargain
ex-post over the terms of the contract within the contract period as well as
in the contract renewal stage. If the labor market is competitive, the ex-post
bargaining between the firm and its employees results in an eﬃcient alloca-
tion, as the firm can replace its employees costlessly without any disruption
in production. However, most jobs involve non-trivial firm-specific skills and
information which develop during the course of the worker’s employment.
Employees such as, high level managers, sales representatives, key product
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engineers, and members of the production teams possess firm-specific human
capital, and the firm cannot replace them with new inexperienced workers
at the spot labor market. As pointed out by Williamson et. al. (1975),
although the firm’s initial hiring decision takes place in a competitive labor
market, once the worker’s skills are developed as a result of experience, the
employment relationship resembles a bilateral monopoly. Therefore, in the
ex-post bargaining game the hold-up problem may arise.2 This, in turn, may
create ineﬃciencies both ex-ante and ex-post.
In this paper, we study the bargaining relationship between a firm and
its incumbent worker who possesses firm-specific human capital. We show
that, in the contract renewal stage, the worker’s ability to strategically dis-
close his skills increases his bargaining power vis-à-vis the firm. The firm can
threaten to fire the worker and hire a new inexperienced worker or the worker
can also quit and work elsewhere, but these threats are not always credible.
Even though the bargaining game takes place in an environment with per-
fect information, there exist ineﬃcient equilibria in which delays occur in real
time. The wage bargaining between the firm and its skilled workers results
in ex-post ineﬃciency in the production. This supports the arguments in
Williamson et. al. (1975) that sequential spot contracting in the labor mar-
ket is not eﬃcient when firm-specific human capital is important. Instead,
hierarchical organization of labor such as internal labor markets promotes
eﬃciency by avoiding individual bargaining.3
The specialized skills and information which we call firm-specific human
capital, develop either as a part of on-the-job training or accrue naturally
during the course of employment.4 In most jobs, especially those involving
2There is an extensive literature on the hold-up problem in bilateral relationships and
its remedies. Among these, Grossman and Hart (1986) studied the incentives to invest
in relationship-specific investment when there is contractual incompleteness. Rogerson
(1992), Chung (1991), MacLeod and Malcomson (1993) are among those who studied the
contractual solutions to ex-ante ineﬃciency that is created by ex-post hold-up problem.
3The internal labor markets paradigm which is pioneered by Doeringer and Piore
(1971), argues that there are hierarchical carrer structure within a firm. The wages are
attached to jobs rather than workers which eliminates the ineﬃcient bargaining between
the firm and its incumbent workers. In fact, recent empirical analysis of personnel data of
large firms (See Baker et. al, 1994; Gibbs and Hendricks, 2004; Dohmen, 2004) reveal that
formal salary systems mainly determine the wage policy within the firm. In a formal salary
system, the employees’ seniority wage profiles are largely independent from idiosyncratic
employee characteristics but rather wage raises are centerally administered.
4According to Green and Montogomery (1998) more than one in six young people
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“idiosyncratic tasks” the firm-specific human capital is an important input
for the firm. Familiarity with the physical environment (Doeringer and Piore
1971), customer relationships (Anderson and Schimittlein 1984), the ability
to communicate and work eﬀectively with the members of a team (Mailath
and Postlewaite 1990, and Klein 1988) are examples of firm-specific human
capital. When the firm-specific skills develop as a result of on-the-job training
that is, an investment in human capital, the possibility of ex-post bargain-
ing creates both ex-ante and ex-post ineﬃciencies. The ex-ante ineﬃciency
arises because the parties’ incentives to invest in specific human capital are
distorted.5 The ex-post ineﬃciency, on the other hand, arises because the
worker may strategically disclose his specialized skills during the ex-post
bargaining, causing delays in bargaining. In this model we focus on the firm-
specific human capital that accrues naturally to the worker during the course
of his employment without a significant cost to either him or the firm. In
this way, we isolate the eﬀects of the ex-ante investment decisions and study
only the ex-post ineﬃciencies that may arise in the relationship.
The paper borrows ideas from and is related to the non-cooperative bar-
gaining literature. It is a well known result in the bargaining literature that
if there is an informational asymmetry between the negotiating parties, then
in equilibrium delays occur in real time (for example, see Admati and Perry,
1987). In these models, the delay serves as a signalling device. In contrast,
the works of Fernandez and Glazer (1991), Haller and Holden (1990), and
Busch and Wen (1995) show that delays can also be observed in equilibrium
in bargaining games with perfect information. The alternating oﬀers bar-
gaining game with constant disagreement payoﬀs (see Rubinstein, 1982) has
a unique equilibrium. If the disagreement payoﬀs are endogenous, that is, if
the value of disagreement payoﬀs depend on the actions taken by players in
each period, then the players’ oﬀers in the bargaining game depend not only
on the past rejected oﬀers, but also on the actions taken in the disagreement
stage. As in repeated games, multiple equilibria exist because the history-
dependent strategies can be used to punish the players for deviations from
the proposed equilibrium actions, thus deterring deviations. If the game has
multiple equilibria, ineﬃcient equilibrium where delays occur can easily be
constructed.
This paper contributes to the literature on non-Walrasian wage bargain-
acquired only firm-specific skills in their first substantial job.
5Becker (1962) is the first who considered incentives to invest in specific human capital.
3
ing where the existence of wage diﬀerentials in labor market is attributed
to the higher bargaining power of insiders compared to outsiders. In these
models, however, the way in which the worker’s firm-specific skills increases
his bargaining power is not explicitly modelled. In Shaked and Sutton (1984)
this bargaining power is characterized by the firm’s inability to replace its
current workforce on the spot. The firm’s current workforce enjoys a bar-
gaining advantage because it is time-consuming for the firm to replace them.
During the wage bargaining, the firm bargains with the incumbent worker for
a number of periods before it makes an oﬀer to an outsider. The game has
a unique equilibrium. If the time period during which the firm is forced to
bargain with the insider decreases, the equilibrium approaches a Walrasian
solution. If the time period increases, then the outsider does not represent
a threat to the insider and the equilibrium is similar to the one in bilateral
monopoly. Stole and Zwiebel (1996a, 1996b) developed a model of intra-firm
bargaining between the firm and its skilled employees in order to explain
the firm’s input and organizational design decisions. In their model of intra-
firm bargaining, the firm has many employees but it bargains with each one
individually. The worker’s bargaining power stems from his threat to quit.
This threat is credible insofar as it deprives the firm from the worker’s con-
tribution, thus, weakens its position against the remaining workers. The
bargaining game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium. An extension of
this model is studied in Wolinsky (2000) where the firm has the opportunity
to replace the existing workers.
All of these models of bargaining between the firm and the incumbent
workers assume that the production takes place after a new agreement is
reached. Hence, both the firm and worker receives zero as their disagree-
ment payoﬀs. In contrast, in our model the bargaining game takes place
concurrently with production. The worker’s decision in the disagreement
stage involves how much eﬀort to exert. In our model, if the worker al-
ways strike in the disagreement stage, hence, produce nothing, both players’
disagreement payoﬀs would also be zero.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic
model. Section 3 charcterizes the equilibrium of the basic model. Section
4 extends the basic model by introducing outside options for both players.
Finally, Section 3 concludes.
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2 The Model
A firm is randomly matched with a worker from a competitive market of
identical workers. They sign a contract that specifies the wage that the
agent will be paid for a day’s work. This wage is equal to the competitive
wage which is denoted by wc. This relationship produces one unit of output
in each production period. We assume that initially the worker is unskilled
and he does not need to exert eﬀort to perform the job. However, as the
worker continues to work in the same firm, his productivity increases as he
acquires both general and firm-specific human capital. He develops these
skills without exerting any eﬀort. We assume that, after some time, the
worker is able to produce θ > 1 units of output when he combines his skills
with high levels of eﬀort. The parameter θ can be thought of as the skill-
weighted productivity of the worker in this firm as in Lazear (2003). High
eﬀort levels impose disutility c to the worker. Although the incumbent worker
was drawn from a pool of identical workers before the initial contract was
signed, he gradually becomes more productive than the outsiders. Hence the
employment relationship resembles a bilateral monopoly. Once the initial
contract expires, the worker can negotiate with the firm to raise his wage
above the competitive wage.6 The incumbent worker’s ability to increase his
salary depends on his ability to strategically disclose his firm-specific skills
during the contract negotiation.
We characterize the wage negotiation as an alternating oﬀers bargaining
game between the firm and the incumbent worker which takes place concur-
rently with the production. We first consider the game in which neither the
firm nor the worker has outside option. Let this game be called G0 game.
The structure of the game is as follows. In each odd-numbered period, the
worker proposes a new wage contract wt. The firm then responds by either
accepting or rejecting the oﬀer. If the firm accepts the oﬀer, the negotiation
game ends. In the new wage contract the worker is paid wt, and the firm
retains θ−wt, thereafter. If the firm rejects the oﬀer, then the players receive
their disagreement payoﬀs which depend on the action taken by the worker.
The worker can either work hard and produce the output θ, or shirk and
produce 1. If the worker works hard he incurs disutility c. Therefore, his
utility when he works hard, is wc − c. If he shirks, he does not expend any
6If there is no breach penalties, the worker could also ask for the raise before the initial
contract has expired.
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eﬀort; hence his utility is wc.7 The worker’s decision is observed by the firm,
and time advances one period.
In every even-numbered period, the firm oﬀers a wage contract, wt, to
the worker. The worker then responds by either accepting or rejecting the
oﬀer. The acceptance of the oﬀer implements a binding contract between the
firm and the agent that holds forever. If the worker rejects the oﬀer, then
the worker chooses between shirking and not shirking. The same rules as
described above govern the consequences of the worker’s decision. We make
the following two assumptions to guarantee a non-degenerate solution to the
wage bargaining game.
Assumption 1. θ − c > 1.
Assumption 2. θ > wc + c.
Assumption 1 implies that agreement is strictly preferred to disagreement.
Assumption 2 implies that the total output is suﬃciently large so that the
firm can aﬀord to pay the worker his disutility of work above the competitive
wage. If this condition does not hold, then the production is not eﬃcient and
an agreement between the incumbent worker and the firm is never reached.
In the unique equilibrium of the game, the worker produces 1 unit of output
in return of wage wc. We also assume that both the firm and the worker have
the same discount factor, 0 < δ < 1. Both players maximize their lifetime
utility. Let ui (et) be the disagreement payoﬀ of player i in period t, where
i = w, f , denoting worker and firm, respectively and et = s, ns, denoting
whether the worker has shirked or not in period t.8 If the agreement is
reached at period T <∞, then the worker’s payoﬀ is
(1− δ)
TX
t=1
δt−1uw (et) + δT (wT − c) (1)
and the firm’s payoﬀ is,
7Since the unskilled worker does not choose his eﬀort level, the initial contract does not
specify payments contingent on eﬀort. Once the worker becomes skilled, he can choose
whether or not to work hard. Regardless of his decision, however he is paid wc.
8The worker’s disagreement payoﬀ, uw (et), is defined net of disutility of eﬀort.
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(1− δ)
TX
t=1
δt−1uf (et) + δT (θ − wT ) . (2)
3 Equilibrium
The following proposition characterizes the set of subgame perfect equilib-
ria of the game. Let w = wc + c denote the minimum wage contract and
w = wc + [(θ − 1 + δc)/(1 + δ)] denote the maximum wage contract.
Proposition 1. In the G0 game, any wage contract w such that, w ≤ w ≤ w
can be generated as a subgame perfect equilibrium wage contract with agree-
ment reached in the first period.
Proof. By Proposition 1 of Busch and Wen (1995).
The subgame perfect equilibrium strategies that generate w as an equilib-
rium are the following. The worker’s strategy is to shirk after every rejection,
oﬀer w in every odd-numbered period, and in every even-numbered period
accept an oﬀer wt such that, wt ≥ bw, where bw = wc+[(δ (θ − 1) + c)/(1 + δ)],
and reject otherwise. The firm’s corresponding subgame perfect equilibrium
strategy is to propose bw in every even-numbered period and accept any oﬀer
that pays wt ≤ w in every odd-numbered period. Essentially, if the worker
commits himself to shirking in every period following a rejection, then the
game resembles a Rubinstein’s bargaining game (Rubinstein 1982) with dis-
agreement payoﬀs (wc, 1− wc) and w is the unique equilibrium of this game.
The minimum wage equilibrium, w, is generated by the following pair of
strategies. The firm proposes w +[(1− δ) c/δ] in every even-numbered period
if the worker did not shirk in the previous period and proposes w otherwise.
The firm accepts any oﬀer that pays wt ≤ w in every odd-numbered period.
If the firm deviates from its strategy, it is punished by the maximum wage
equilibrium, w. The worker’s strategy is to oﬀer at least w in every odd-
numbered periods and accept any oﬀer wt ≥ w in every even—numbered
period. In every even-numbered period he shirks if he is not oﬀered at least
w or he does not accept an acceptable oﬀer and in every odd-numbered
period he shirks if he asks more than w or his proposal of w is rejected.9
9The equilibrium strategy that we propose calls for the worker to shirk in every even-
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The construction of the minimum wage contract relies on the firm’s ability
to compensate the worker for not shirking in the disagreement stage. The
firm is willing to oﬀer this additional payment because its per period payoﬀ
if the worker does not shirk, (θ − wc − c) (1− δ) + δ wt+1, is greater than
its per period payoﬀ if the worker shirks, (1− wc) (1− δ) + δ wt+1 due to
Assumption 1.
Any wage contract w such that w < w < w can be supported by sub-
game perfect equilibrium strategies by punishing the worker with the mini-
mum wage equilibrium if he deviates and the firm with the maximum wage
equilibrium if it deviates. The wage increase the worker can capture from
the bargaining game ranges between c and (θ − 1 + δc)/(1 + δ). The mini-
mum wage contract equalizes the worker’s utility to his reservation utility.
Thus, the worker is indiﬀerent between working in this firm or elsewhere at
competitive salary wc. The maximum wage contract is increasing in worker’s
disutility of eﬀort, c, and marginal productivity of his firm-specific skills,
θ − 1. Proposition 1 shows that even when there are no outside options
for players, the worker can sometimes capture substantial part of the rent
created by his firm-specific skills.
Besides the eﬃcient subgame perfect equilibria in which the agreement
is reached at the first period, the bargaining game also have ineﬃcient equi-
libria in which there is a delay in agreement. The following proposition
characterizes these ineﬃcient equilibria.
Proposition 2. If ew is such that
wc + c ≤ ew ≤ δT − 1
δT
(θ − 1 + c) + 1
δT
w (3)
then there is a subgame perfect equilibrium in which the worker shirks for T
periods followed by an agreement of ew.
Proof. For a formal proof see Busch and Wen (1995).
We provide conditions that are suﬃcient for deviations not to occur.
Along the equilibrium path, the players’ strategies are as follows. In every
numbered period and not to shirk in the odd-numbered periods. A strategy that calls
for the worker not to shirk in every period generates the same result. (For a detailed
discussion on this see Busch and Wen 1995.)
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odd-numbered period up to period T + 1, the worker makes a non-serious
oﬀer to the firm and the firm rejects his oﬀer. In every period up to the
period T + 1, the worker shirks. In period T + 1, the worker oﬀers ew if it
is an odd-numbered period, and accepts any oﬀer that pays him at least ew,
if it is an even-numbered period. The firm makes a non-serious oﬀer to the
worker in every even-numbered period up to T +1 . In T +1, the firm oﬀersew, if it is even numbered period, and accepts any oﬀer that pays at least ew,
if it is an odd-numbered period.
The worker can always obtain w in the first period. In order for the
worker to be willing to shirk for T periods and receive ew in period T +1, he
should prefer to receive wc for T periods and ew thereafter. Hence,
∞X
t=1
δt−1 (w − c) ≤
TX
t=1
δt−1wc +
∞X
t=T+1
δt−1 ( ew − c) (4)
or, equivalently
wc + c ≤ ew. (5)
In the same manner, the firm can obtain its lowest equilibrium payoﬀ,
θ − w in the first period. In order for the firm not to deviate from the
equilibrium strategy, it should prefer to receive (1− wc) for T periods and
θ − ew thereafter. Hence,
∞X
t=1
δt−1 (θ − w) ≤
TX
t=1
δt−1 (1− wc) +
∞X
t=T+1
δt−1(θ − ew) (6)
which is equivalent to
ew ≤ δT − 1
δT
(θ − 1 + wc) +
1
δT
w. (7)
In order for ew to exist, wc+c has to be smaller than [(δT − 1)(θ − 1 + wc) + w]
/δT which always holds under Assumption 1. The players’ deviations from
the strategies described above is eliminated by “equilibrium switching”. If
the worker deviates, he is punished with the minimum wage contract. If the
firm deviates, then it is punished with the maximum wage contract.
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4 Bargaining with Outside Options
Now we introduce outside option to both players. In every odd-numbered
period, the rejection of the worker’s proposal leaves the firm with the choice
of firing the incumbent worker and hiring a new worker, or continuing to
bargain with the incumbent worker. In the former case, the firm matches
with a worker from the external labor market. This match yields the payoﬀ
φf = 1 − wc + β (θ − 1), thereafter, where 0 ≤ β < 1. The new worker’s
productivity may be lower than the incumbent worker’s productivity because
the new worker’s skills may not be a perfect match to the firm’s need. In
this sense, β is a measure of market thickness and firm’s search cost.
In every even-numbered period, the rejection of the firm’s oﬀer leaves the
worker with the choice of quitting or staying with the firm. If the incumbent
worker quits, he matches with a new firm where he can utilize some of his
skills and receives wage φw = wc + α (θ − 1), where 0 ≤ α < 1. Here we
interpret α, similar to β, to measure the market thickness and the worker’s
search cost. We assume that the worker’s disutility of eﬀort in the new
firm is c despite the mismatch of skills. We make the following assumption
which guarantees that φf+φw < θ, that is the sum of the firm’s and worker’s
outside options does not exceed the surplus generated within the relationship.
Assumption 3: α+ β < 1.
We call the game with outside option as the G1 game. In an alternating
oﬀers bargaining game, the outside option changes the equilibrium of the
game if and only if the players obtain a higher payoﬀ by exercising this op-
tion than by continuing to bargain with each other.10 Let ε = c/ (θ − 1) be
the measure of eﬃciency of the incumbent worker. The following proposition
characterizes the set of all possible equilibria.
Proposition 3. (i) If α ≤ ε and 1 − ε ≤ β < 1 − α then w = θ − φf is
the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the G1 game. (ii) If α ≤ ε and
δ(1−ε)/(1 + δ) ≤ β ≤ 1−ε then any w such that w ≤ w ≤ θ−φf is a subgame
perfect equilibrium of the G1 game. (iii) If α ≤ ε and β < δ(1− ε)/(1 + δ),
then any w such that w ≤ w < w is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the
10See Shaked and Sutton (1984) more on this. Note that we only allow the player to
opt out after responding an oﬀer to simplify the analysis.
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G1 game. (iv) If ε ≤ α ≤ (1− δε)/(1 + δ) and β < 1 − α then any w such
that φw ≤ w < θ − φf is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the G1 game. (v)
If α ≥ (1 − δε)/(1 + δ) and β < 1 − α then w = φw is the unique subgame
perfect equilibrium of the G1 game.
Proof. A formal proof of this proposition can be found in Osborne and
Rubinstein (1990).
We now discuss the derivation of the conditions in Proposition 3. In any
subgame perfect equilibrium of G0 game the firm receives at least θ − w,
and at most θ − w. In any subgame perfect equilibrium of G0 game the
worker receives at least w, and at most w. The worker’s outside option is
never binding if the payoﬀ he receives from the outside option is less than
the lowest equilibrium payoﬀ he obtains from the G0 game. In other words,
if α ≤ ε then the worker never exercises his outside option. Because of
Assumption 3 it must be true that β < 1−α. If it is also true that β ≥ 1−ε,
then the firm’s outside option is always binding since φf is greater than the
highest equilibrium payoﬀ it can obtain in G0 game. Therefore, if α ≤ ε and
1 − ε ≤ β < 1 − α, then in the unique equilibrium of G1 game the worker
receives his outside option. In the second case, the worker’s outside option is
never binding, and the firm’s outside option is binding for some equilibria of
the G0 game. Hence any w such that w ≤ w ≤ θ − φf is a subgame perfect
equilibrium of the G1 game if α ≤ ε and δ(1 − ε)/(1 + δ) ≤ β ≤ 1 − ε. In
the third case, neither the worker’s nor the firm’s outside option is binding.
Thus, the set of equilibria of the G1 game coincides with the set of equilibria
of the G0. In the fourth case, both players’ outside options lie between their
respective lowest and highest equilibrium payoﬀs of G0 game. Therefore, the
G1 game has multiple equilibria in which the worker receives any wage, w,
such that φw ≤ w ≤ θ−φf . In the last case, worker’s outside option is greater
than the largest equilibrium payoﬀ that he can obtain in G0 game. Hence
in the unique equilibrium of the G1 game, the worker receives his outside
option φw and the firm receives θ − φw.
Proposition 3 reveals that if the firm can easily replace the worker with
new worker from the external market, while the worker cannot easily find a
job that matches his acquired skills, then all the quasi-rents from the rela-
tionship will be captured by the firm. This can be the case during the bust
phase of the business cycle where there is an excess supply of skilled work-
ers. The opposite would occur if the external labor market conditions are
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more accomodating for the worker than the firm, such as during the booms.
This finding accords with the evidence on substantial procyclicality of real
wages (see for example Solon et. al., 1994). For moderate levels of α and β
the multiplicity of equilibria does not disappear with the presence of outside
options. However in the second and fourth cases where at least one player’s
outside option is binding for some equilibria of G0 game, the range of the
equilibria shrinks.
It can be easily shown that ineﬃcient equilibria continue to exist also in
the second and fourth cases of the Proposition 3. Both players can obtain
their lowest payoﬀ in a perfect equilibrium where the agreement is reached
in the first period. We first derive the range of the ineﬃcient equilibria when
ε ≤ α ≤ (1 − δε)/(1 + δ) and β < 1 − α. The worker can always obtain
wc + α (θ − 1) in the first period. In order for the worker to be willing to
shirk for T periods and receive w∗ in period T +1, he should prefer to receive
wc for T periods and w∗ thereafter. Hence,
∞X
t=1
δt−1 [wc + α (θ − 1)− c] ≤
TX
t=1
δt−1wc +
∞X
t=T+1
δt−1 (w∗ − c) (8)
or
wc + c+
α (θ − 1)− c
δT
≤ w∗. (9)
In the same manner, the firm can obtain its lowest equilibrium payoﬀ, 1 −
wc + β (θ − 1), in the first period. In order for the firm not to deviate from
the equilibrium strategy, it should prefer to receive (1− wc) for T periods
and w∗ thereafter. Hence, we have
∞X
t=1
δt−1 [1− wc + β (θ − 1)] ≤
TX
t=1
δt−1 (1− wc) +
∞X
t=T+1
δt−1(θ − w∗) (10)
which is equivalent to
w∗ ≤ θ − 1 + wc −
β (θ − 1)
δT
. (11)
In order for w∗ to exist, the term at the left hand side of inequality (9) has to
be less than the term at the right hand side of inequality (11) which holds if
δT > (α+β)(θ−1)/(θ−1− c). In other words, with the presence of credible
outside options, the existence of ineﬃcient equilibria requires patient players
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and delays are shortened. For α ≤ ε and δ(1 − ε)/(1 + δ) ≤ β ≤ 1 − ε any
w∗∗ such that wc + c ≤ w∗∗ ≤ θ − 1 + wc − (β (θ − 1)/δT ) is a subgame
perfect equilibrium in which the worker shirks for T periods followed by an
agreement of w∗∗.
5 Concluding Remarks
Following the pioneering work of Becker (1962) on human capital theory, la-
bor economists largely have focused on institutional and contractual remedies
that promote eﬃcient investment on acquisition of both general and specific
skills.11 In this respect, most studies have analyzed ex-ante ineﬃciencies cre-
ated by a hold-up problem. However, the question of how strategic disclosure
of these skills may create ex-post ineﬃciencies in worker-firm bargaining has
been little explored.
The existing literature on the wage bargaining between the firm and its
skilled workers emphasizes that firm-specific human capital is the source
of the worker’s increased bargaining power. However, these models fail to
capture the ex-post ineﬃciency that may arise as a result of the bargaining.
In this paper, we study the bargaining relationship between a firm and its
incumbent worker who possesses firm-specific human capital. The incumbent
worker is more productive than the outsiders because of the special skills and
information he acquires during his employment. During the contract renewal
stage, the worker can strategically disclose these skills in order to increase
his bargaining power.
We find that when one party’s outside option is always binding, the bar-
gaining game has a unique equilibrium. In these cases, the model predicts
that wages are proyclical. In all other cases, however, the game has multiple
equilibria in some of which there is delay in reaching agreement. Whenever
the outside option of at least one party is binding for some equilibria, the
delays are shortened. As it has been uncovered in empirical studies (such
as Cingano, 2003), firm-specific skills are crucial source of wage growth. In
addition, each parties’ ability to extract rent is disciplined by external fac-
tors as in Lazear and Oyer (2004) who provides evidence on the impact of
external factors on firm’s wage setting behaviour in Sweden.
11Prendergast (1993), Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) and Balmaceda (2005) are just a
few to name in this extensive literature.
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Our model provides a theoretical rationale for an array of wage contracts
that ranges from competitive skilled wage, w, to premium skilled wage, w,
to be observed as an equilibrium outcome. This result is in accord with
empirical studies of wage policies of individual firms. For instance, in their
in-depth study of a large corporation’s personnel data, Baker et. al (1999)
documents that there is substantial individual variation in wages within each
job level, as well as in their growth rate. Moreover, the same study reveals
“cohort eﬀects” where cohorts who earn more on entry maintain their ad-
vantage through time. In our model this eﬀect is reflected by higher initial
wages, wc, later leading to higher negotiated wages on average.12
Although the skill acquisition is not explicitly modeled here, our model
also have implications for eﬃcient skill acquisition and who should pay for
it. To the extent that firm-specific skills increases worker’s bargaining power
in wage negotiation, it is a valuable asset for the worker. In this respect, the
standard view on workers’ reluctance in investing in firm-specific skills does
not apply here. The worker is better oﬀ with higher firm-specific skills when
supply of these skills in the external market is scarce. Scones and Bernhardt
(1998) provides a model where workers may invest in firm-specific capital
without long-term contract. The driving force in their model is asymmetric
information on worker’s productivity.
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